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INTRODUCTION

In 2012, millions of viewers of the Showtime television series Homeland
watched as a fictional U.S. Vice President was assassinated via terrorist
cyberattack on his pacemaker. While art wasn't an exact imitation of life, the
episode was inspired by real-life Vice President Dick Cheney's concerns about
the security of his implanted defibrillator, as well as by the issues raised by a
new generation of implanted medical devices.2 Devices like pacemakers, insulin
pumps, and bladder stimulators monitor body functions, deliver medications, and
even communicate remotely with doctors. Medical devices, like the examples
listed above, are becoming part of the "internet of things." However, the price
for such improved healthcare can be an increased cybersecurity risk and potential
civil liability for device manufacturers.
As this Article will discuss, the question of cybersecurity for implanted
medical devices has already crossed from the realm of fiction and theoretical
exercise to the real world. In the fall of 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security announced that it was investigating about two dozen instances of
suspected cybersecurity flaws in medical devices and hospital equipment that
government officials feared were exploitable by hackers. The two dozen cases
covered a wide range of equipment, including medical imaging equipment and
hospital networking systems. The investigation also included an infusion pump
(a piece of hospital equipment that delivers medication directly into a patient's
bloodstream) from Hospira, Inc. and implantable heart devices from Medtronic
and St. Jude Medical, Inc.6 The review, which did not make or imply any
allegation of wrongdoing, was conducted by the Department's Industrial Control
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), whose mandate is to
protect critical U.S. infrastructure from cyber threats, whether they are
introduced through human error, computer viruses, or through intentional
criminal or terrorist attacks.
The motivation for cyberattacks on implanted medical devices may not
always be as extreme as an assassination attempt or desire to inflict personal
injury. More likely motivations include the acquisition of private information

1.
Jim Finkle, U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible Cyber Flaws,
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/US-cybersecurity-

medicaldevices-insight-idUSKCNOIBODQ20141022#SKMYBYDqX4XDI8sA,97.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7.

Id-
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for financial gain or competitive advantage; sabotage by a disgruntled employee
or dissatisfied customer; a desire to damage a device manufacturer's reputation
(the medical device industry is an approximate $30 billion a year business); or in
the case of some hackers, ego satisfaction. Forrester Research predicts that the
primary hacking trend for 2016 will be "ransomware for a medical device or
wearable," as cyber attackers make prime targets of "[p]acemakers and other
vital health devices," "toying with their stability and potentially threatening the
victim with their own life should the ransom demands not be met." 8
When assessing the vulnerabilities, it's important to have a general
understanding of implanted (or implantable) medical devices, or IMDs. An IMD
is usually defined as "an electronic device that is permanently or semipermanently implanted on a patient with the purpose of treating a medical
condition, improving the functioning of some body part, or providing the user
with a capability that he[/she] did not possess before."9 The most common
IMDs include cardiac implanted devices (such as pacemakers and implanted
cardioverter defibrillators, or ICDs), which are designed to treat cardiac
conditions by monitoring the heart's electrical activity and applying electrical
impulses or shocks to restore the heart's rhythm to the appropriate speed.10
However, IMDs also include drug delivery systems (such as insulin pumps),
which - once surgically implanted under the skin - supply medication in a
regulated, localized, and prolonged manner." There are also biosensors, in
which the IMD measures certain physiological parameters and communicates
with an external controller or programmer, as well as neurostimulators.1
Neurostimulators are implanted in very specific areas, transmitting lowamplitude electrical signals through electrodes placed in different parts of the
brain.1 3 Through this Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), the devices are used to
14
treat a variety of conditions, including Parkinson's disease and epilepsy.
Despite the risk of cyberattacks that directly threaten the well-being or even
the life of those with IMDs (what we will call "active" attacks), a more likely
threat is a "passive" cyberattack that compromises a device's security and

8.
RansomwareExpected to Hit 'Lifesaving'MedicalDevices in 2016, SLASHDOT (Nov. 23,
http://it.slashdot.org/story/15/11/23/1337234/ransomware-expected-to-hit2015,
10:47 AM),
lifesaving-medical-devices-in-2016 (citing RICK HOLLAND & HEIDI SHEY, PREDICTIONS 2016:
CYBERSECURITY
SWINGS TO PREVENTION (2015), https://www.forrester.com/Predictions+
2016+Cybersecurity+Swings+To+Prevention/fulltext/-/E-res 117390).
9.
Carmen Camara et al., Security and Privacy Issues in Implantable Medical Devices: A
Comprehensive Survey, 55 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 272, 274 (2015) (citing Jeremy A. Hansen
& Nicole M. Hansen, A Taxonomy of Vulnerabilities in Implantable Medical Devices, SPIMACS
'10, Oct. 2010, at 13).
10. Id. (citing JOHN G. WEBSTER, DESIGN OF CARDIAC PACEMAKERS (1995)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Timothy R. Lukins et al., The Latest Evidence on Target Selection in Deep
Brain Stimulationfor Parkinson'sDisease, 21 J. CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 22,22 (2014)).
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wrongfully obtains patient data, including protected health information (PHI)."
Devices that collect health data could be subject to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which regulates the saving,
accessing, and sharing of identifiable protected health information.16 Although
HIPAA's Security Rule sets standards for protecting electronically shared PHI,
the Act does not expressly regulate companies that develop hardware and
software applications that collect, store, and analyze medical data (PHI use for
health care providers, plans, and clearinghouses and their third party vendors
with PHI access is subject to the Act)." So who regulates medical devices? The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does, but as this Article will illustrate, it is
only recently that the FDA has displayed a heightened interest in cybersecurity
issues.
Yet even in the absence of a more proactive regulatory approach,
medical device manufacturers need to be aware that the risk of civil liability for
passive cyberattacks does not begin and end with HIPAA. Many state laws
regarding medical privacy and data security are more protective than their
federal counterpart, and could pertain to a broader class of companiesincluding medical device manufacturers.1 9
For example, California's
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) dictates some particularly
rough rules for permissible uses and disclosures of medical information, and its
restrictions also apply to "health data custodians" who are not health care
providers.20 This can include any "business offering software or hardware that
makes medical information available to consumers, whether for information
management, diagnosis, or treatment purposes"-clearly encompassing medical
device manufacturers.2 1
A May 2015 report, prepared by the national law firm Bryan Cave, revealed
that between July 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014 there were 566 publicly
22
reported data breaches.
During that same time period, there were roughly 672
data privacy lawsuits filed, and 110 class actions over data breaches, involving
23
25 unique defendants.
In such a climate of increased concern over data
security, and with increasing regulatory interest (if not necessarily scrutiny) from
the FDA, it will be hard for medical device manufacturers to argue that they
didn't know or couldn't have known of the risks of cyberattacks on IMDs,
whether such risks pertain to active or passive cyberattacks.

15. See id. at 278.
16. Jeff Rabkin & Jessica Jardine Wilkers, Wearable Technology, Big Data and the Legal
Frontier, LAW.COM (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.law.com/sites/lawcomcontrib/2015/12/14/
wearable-technology-big-data-and-the-legal-frontier/.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22.

DAVID ZETOONY ET AL., BRYAN CAVE, 2015 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 3

(May 2015).

23.

Id-
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This Article will provide some vital background on IMDs themselves and
examine how cyberattacks can happen.24 It will also examine some of the
various security measures being explored to prevent such attacks.2 The Article
will also look at perhaps the most likely, if not life-threatening, type of attack,
26
the passive cyberattack.
In addition, it will examine the civil liability
implications for medical device manufacturers; in the absence of any lawsuits to
date over cyberattacks on IMDs, useful analogies can be drawn from the data
breach /data privacy actions that have been initiated against other entities in the
health care industry.2 This Article will also analyze the changing regulatory
hardscape for medical device manufacturers in terms of cybersecurity, and will
discuss the more active role taken by the FDA regarding cyber risks and IMDsincluding issuing its first directive ever in July 2015 for healthcare facilities to
stop using a product because of a cybersecurity threat.28 Finally, this Article will
discuss how medical device manufacturers can decrease their legal risks
stemming from cyber liability exposure.29 Risk analysis, enhanced education of
company personnel, and collaboration with those in the cybersecurity field as
well as regulators can all play vital roles in understanding and combating the
cybersecurity risks associated with implanted medical devices. Given the dearth
of case law in this area, this Article hopes to provide much needed background
information and practical guidance. After all, heart-pounding drama is better
served on the television screen than in the courtroom or the boardroom.
II. IMPLANTED

MEDICAL
DEVICES-SOME
CYBERATTACKS CAN HAPPEN

BACKGROUND,

AND

HOW

IMDs have come a long way since "[t]he first implantable cardiac
pacemaker, developed by Medtronic founder Earl Bakken, was released in
1958."3 In the United States alone, by 2010 an estimated 2.6 million people
were relying on IMDs." Each year, 300,000 Americans receive wireless
32
medical devices.
Man and machine are undergoing increasing integration as
IMDs like cardiac pacemakers, defibrillators, cochlear implants, neurostimulators, and drug delivery systems like insulin pumps have become

24.

See infra Part II.

25.

See infra Part III.

26.
27.
28.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.

29.

See infra Part VII.

30. Neal Leavitt, ResearchersFight to Keep Implanted Medical Devices Safe from Hackers,
COMPUTER, Aug. 2010, at 11.

3 1. Id.
32. Marc Goodman, Who Does the Autopsy? The Criminal Implications of Implantable
Medical Devices, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology
/future tense/2015/03/implantable medical devices hacking who does the autopsy.html#cx.
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increasingly common.
The implantable medical device market was already a
$25.2 billion industry by 2012.34 A 2012 study by the Freedonia Group put the
figure even higher (at $36 billion a year), and estimated that demand for IMDs
would increase 7.7 percent annually and be a $52 billion industry by 2015.
While orthopedic implants comprise the largest segment of the IMD field,
technological advances in cardiovascular care and other areas have enabled
pacemakers, defibrillators, and drug-delivery insulin pumps to assume a growing
share of the IMD market. 36
Regardless of whether they are implanted on a permanent or long-term basis
(like a pacemaker or implantable cardiac defibrillator) or for a shorter timeframe
(like a neuro-stimulator or insulin pump), it is the improvement in technology
itself that gave rise to cybersecurity concerns with IMDs. "Initially, IMDs were
stand-alone devices that did not frequently communicate with the outside
world." 3 But "[i]n October 2005, Zarlink Semiconductor introduced the first
transceiver module designed explicitly for linking implanted medical devices
and base stations."
As a result, wireless technologies have made direct
communications between an IMD and a base station controller, like a personal
computer, possible. Physiological information, like glucose levels or heartrate,
can be sent from the IMD to a patient's physician for monitoring and treatment
management purposes.3 9 In the case of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator
(ICD), for example, doctors can use the device to monitor a cardiac patient's
heart condition and program it to deliver the right level of electrical shock in
order to make the heart beat properly and send data about that patient's cardiac
rhythm to the doctor. 40 Each year countless sudden heart attacks are prevented
through the use of such devices.4 1
Some IMDs, such as blood glucose monitors, have traditionally been "send
only." 42
But as technology has advanced to permit two-way wireless
communications, IMDs can now communicate with a variety of devices over
multiple lines of communication. 43
These could include a bidirectional
component, such as a remote controller or wand, as well as a "receive only"

33.

Id.

34. Amy M. Rubenstein & Brittany Robbins, Hacking Health Care: When Cybersecurity
Can Mean Life or Death, PROD. LIAB. AND MASS TORTS BLOG (Nov. 26, 2015),
http:www.productliabilityandmasstorts.com/2015/1 1/hacking-health-care-when-cybersecurity-canmean-life-or-death.
35.

THE FREEDONIA GROUP, IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES: INDUSTRY STUDY WITH

FORECASTS FOR 2015 & 2020, 4 (2012), http://www.freedoniagroup.com/industry-study/2852/
implantable-medical-devices.html.

36.

Id.

37.
38.
39.

Goodman, supranote 32.
Leavitt, supra note 30, at 11-12.
Goodman, supra note 32.

40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43.

Leavitt, supra note 30, at 11.
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device like a PC that acquires patient status data.44 In the case of insulin pumps,
for example, the devices use low-power chips with small transceivers capable of
both sending data (such as blood glucose levels) to another component and then
receiving commands (such as, increase the dose of insulin being pumped).4 5
"IMDs work with various radio technologies, [most of which initially operated]
over distances of several centimeters and transmit within designated medical
frequency bands." 46 In 2006, full radio-frequency based implantable devices
received FDA approval to operate in the 400 MHz range.4 7 Longer ranges offer
certain benefits such as greater patient mobility during in-home data collection,
or being able to move computer equipment farther away from the patient and
thus protect sterile environments in operating rooms. 48 Significantly, however,
longer ranges also make IMD systems more accessible, including to potential
hackers. 49
Wireless connections clearly offer valuable benefits, such as enabling
physicians and technicians to download critical data (like the frequency of heartshocks), and to make modifications to care without the need for surgical
intervention.so In addition, the wireless nature of IMDs makes it possible for a
device to be repaired remotely, or to provide medical personnel with an alert
about the status of the device itself (such as a burned-out wire)." And making
IMDs open to radio-controlled systems can provide a critical timing advantage in
emergency situations over alternative methods like passwords, particularly when
the patient herself is unconscious.5 However, becoming part of the "Internet of
things" through connection to computers, phones, etc., also makes IMDs
susceptible to cyberattacks.
As researchers writing in the New England
Journal of Medicine noted in 2010, IMD features like automatic, remote, and
wireless communication may "have provided improved care and quality of life
for millions of patients, but they also have created a susceptibility to security
breaches that could compromise the performance of such devices and the safety
54
and privacy of patients."
Cyberattacks on IMDs can essentially be divided into two main categories:
passive cyberattacks, in which an attacker primarily acquires access and data

44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Dimitar Kostadinov, H@cking Implantable Medical Devices, INFOSEC INST. (2014),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hcking-implantable-medical-devices/.
48.

Leavitt, supra note 30, at 13.

49. Id.
50. Kostadinov, supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Leavitt, supra note 30, at 12.
54. William H. Maisel & Tadayoshi Kohno, Improving the Security and Privacy of
ImplantableMedical Devices, 363 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1164, 1164 (2010).
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such as a patient's private information, and active cyberattacks." In active
cyberattacks, the adverse actor is not only capable of intercepting data
exchanged over the radio frequency in use, but also of sending commands to the
IMD modifying them in transit between the IMD and the programmer or simply
blocking the messages so that they do not arrive.56 The attacks can take the form
of interruptions, interceptions, or modifications of messages, or even generation
of new messages.
An active attacker, in this manner, could for example
8
repeatedly request information from the device intending to drain its battery.
Or he could attempt to induce a shock to the patient, disable a therapy, cause a
drug delivery device to deliver an overdose of medication, or even attempt to
modify the configuration of a device.5 9
Skeptics, including at one point officials from the FDA, may point out that
there are no known incidents of such active cyberattacks on IMDs, and that the
risk of purposeful harm caused by the disruption of a specific medical device is
"exceedingly rare."60 However, such an attitude dangerously ignores historical
precedent about the potential for such an attack. For example, in 1998, a
television station near one hospital turned on a new digital televisions transmitter
employing a formerly vacant channel, overwhelming low-power cardiac
monitors at that hospital with electromagnetic interference and rendering them
incapable of providing critical care readings. 6 1
"[I]n 2003 and in 2009
respectively, the Slammer and Conficker worms had each successfully infected
[some] networked hospital systems responsible for monitoring heart patients. 62
And in one of the first computer attacks to actually cause physical harm, in 2008
hackers added flashing computer animation to an epilepsy support group's online
message board, triggering seizures in members of the support group.63
Certainly former U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney cannot be counted in the
skeptic camp when it comes to the potential for cyberattacks on implantable

55. See Monika Darji & Bhushan Trivedi, IMD-IDS a Specification based Intrusion
Detection System for Wireless IMDs, 5 INT'L J. APPLIED INFO. SYS. Q 18, 19 (Apr. 2012).

56. See id.
57. See id.
58.

Id.

59.

See id.

60. John F. Murray, Jr., Software Compliance Expert, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, Prepared statement for the Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality of the National
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (Nov. 19, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/041119pl.htm).
61.
UPGRADE:

JOSEPH P. MCCLAIN, PHD, DIRECTOR OF CLINICAL ENGINEERING DIVISION, TIME TO
NEw TELEMETRY

STANDARDS

CALL

FOR A NEw

GENERATION

OF WIRELESS

EQUIPMENT, http:www.ashe.org/resources/WMTS/pdfs/timetoupgrade.pdf.
62. Goodman, supra note 32.
63. Kevin Poulsen, Hackers Attack Epilepsy Patient Via Computer, WIRED (Mar. 28, 2008),
http://www.wired.com/2008/05/report-fbi-inve/.
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medical devices. 64 Cheney, a longtime cardiac patient with an implanted
cardioverter defibrillator (ICD), revealed in an interview that he had his device's
Bluetooth capabilities disabled in 2007 over concerns about potential
assassination attempts via hacking.65 Cheney said, "I was aware of the danger, if
you will, that existed."66 Cheney's concerns inspired a dramatization on the
Showtime drama Homeland, in which fictional American Vice-President Walden
is assassinated via cyberattack on his pacemaker, thanks to the device's wireless
access information being grovided to Al-Qaeda by American P.O.W.-turnedsleeper agent Sgt. Brodie.
Of the fictional portrayal, former Vice-President
Cheney pronounced it "credible, because I knew from the experience that we had
assessing the need for my own device that it was an accurate portrayal of what
was possible." 68
In the absence of actual cyberattacks on IMDs, experts have repeatedly
demonstrated how palpable the threat is and how comparatively easy to
69
accomplish. Consider the following examples:
At a Blackberry Security Summit in 2015, Blackberry Chief Security Officer
David Kleidermacher and security researcher Graham Murphy demonstrated
how, thanks to an Ethernet port built into the mechanics of an IV infusion pump
used to administer medications, hackers could shut down the pump, and increase
or decrease the medication dosage being delivered.70 Hackers could also access
the health care providers Wi-Fi network and compromise sensitive, confidential
data including patient information. With just a network cable, a laptop or tablet,
and same hacking knowledge, Kleidermacher pointed out, a healthcare
provider's "soft underbelly" could be exposed since the "proliferation of new
types of life-saving medical devices" provides "incredible surface area for
attacks" as well.n
In a two year study, Scott Erven, the head of information security for
Essentia Health, conducted an evaluation of the cyber risks present in the
medical equipment in Essentia's 100 facilities throughout Minnesota, North
Dakota, Wisconsin, and Idaho.7 2 He found drug infusion pumps (used to deliver

64. See Dan Kloeffler and Alexis Shaw, Dick Cheney Feared Assassination Via Medical
Device Hacking: 'I Was Aware of the Danger,' ABC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2013), http://abcnews.com/

US/vice-president-dick-cheney-feared-pacemaker-hack/.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Homeland: Broken Hearts (Showtime television broadcast Dec. 2, 2012).
68. Kloeffler & Shaw, supranote 64.
69.

See Kim Zetter, It's Insanely Easy to Hack Hospital Equipment," WIRED (Apr. 25, 2014,

6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/hospital-equipment-vulnerable/ (discussing an expert
and his team's observations at a large healthcare facility and the ease at which an attacker can
collect data from medical devices, patient records, and even refrigeration systems).
70. Judy Mottl, Blackberry Offers Insight on Hidden Security Headaches for Patients,
Providers, FIERCEMOBILE HEALTHCARE (July 27, 2015), http:www.fiercemobilehealthcare.

com/story/blackberry-offers-insight-hidden-security-headaches-patients-providers/2015-07-27.
71. Id.
72. Zetter, supranote 69.
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everything from painkillers like morphine to chemotherapy drugs) that were
vulnerable to being "remotely manipulated to change the dosage;" Bluetooth
enabled defibrillators that could be "manipulated to deliver random shocks to a
patient's heart or prevent a medically needed shock from occurring;" and digital
medical records that were susceptible to being altered "to cause physicians to
misdiagnose, prescribe the wrong drugs or administer unwarranted care."
Regarding the implantable cardiovascular defibrillators in particular, Erven noted
that his team
found a couple of defibrillator vendors that use a Bluetooth stack for
writing configurations and doing test shocks (against the patient) when
they're implanted or after surgery. They have default and weak
passwords to the Bluetooth stack so you can connect to the devices. It's
a simple password like an iPhone PIN that you could guess very
quickly.7 4
In 2011, IBM computer security expert Jay Radcliffe demonstrated how an
insulin pump could be manipulated by cyber attackers to administer a lethal dose
of insulin." A diabetic himself, he studied the manual for his personal device
and acquired the exact frequency and modulation method on which it operated.7 6
And thanks to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)'s ID provided in
the device's manual, Radcliffe was able to obtain the patent paperwork for the
device itself, yielding invaluable detail on the composition and functionality of
the pump.
That information led him to purchase the Arduino module, a
wireless peripheral device utilizing frequencies much like those of his insulin
pump, and which could scan for insulin pumps in a 100 to 200 foot vicinity.
Radcliffe found the device's command codes and message formatting on
Google, despite the fact that the manufacturer hadn't disclosed this
information.7 9 Armed with the knowledge of the targeted pump's serial number
(something requiring physical access to a targeted device prior to hacking),
Radcliffe could then change the device's configuration settings in a matter of
seconds.80 Armed with the information he had, Radcliffe was able to calculate
how to interrupt the data sensor to send inaccurate blood sugar values, inducing
81
the device to deliver an overdose of insulin.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75.

Kostadinov, supranote 47.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Chinese Hacked Sony, OPM and then My Vasectomy!, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2015),

http://medium.com/homeland-security/the-chinese-hacked-sony-opm-and-then-my-vasectomy-

a549fa7e4a01#.90rimjvd_(citing Eric Basu, Hacking Insulin Pumps And Other Medical Devices
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Not long after Radcliffe's demonstration, McAfee security specialist
Barnaby Jack showed that an insulin pump's radio control and vibrating alert
safety mode were vulnerable to hackers.82 At a hackers conference in 2011, he
used custom software and a custom-built antenna with a scanning range of 300
feet, and for which he did not need to know the serial number for the targeted
device, a Medtronic insulin pump.8 3 Jack demonstrated how the same tiny radio
transmitter that permits doctors to adjust the pump's functions could be turned
against it, allowing the cyber attacker to disable the alert feature and dispense a
potentially lethal dose of insulin.84 At a subsequent conference Jack was
scheduled to give a presentation on hacking pacemakers and ICDs, entitled
"Implantable Medical Devices: Hacking Humans."85
Jack planned to
demonstrate how, as with the insulin pump, a cyber attacker could seize control
over a targeted device through its wireless transmitter from a laptop 30 to 50 feet
away, and cause it to either withhold therapy or to deliver a deadly 830-volt
shock.86 Jack's hack involved making the ICD disclose its serial and model
number after interception of the wireless signal, and using that information to
alter the factory program code of the transmitter.
Unfortunately, Jack died
shortly before the conference.
In fact, as far back as 2008, computer researchers were able to illustrate how
vulnerable the technology in IMDs is when they remotely reprogrammed a
combination defibrillator and pacemaker and caused it to shut down and deliver
jolts of potentially fatal electricity.89 Using inexpensive and widely available
Linux PC and GNU radio software, a team from Harvard University, the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, and the University of Washington
intercepted the short-range radio signals between the device and its authorized
external controller. 90 University of Massachusetts-Amherst Professor Kevin Fu
pointed out that after the "radio allowed us to listen to sample radio
communications between a [controller] and the device, then replay the
communication to control the device," they were able to cause the IMD "to emit
a shock designed to induce [a fatal heart rhythm]." 91 In addition, the team
demonstrated that with such access, they could disable stored settings in the
IMD, rendering it unable to respond during an emergency.92 They also showed

From Black Hat, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2013/08/
03/hacking-insulin-pumps-and-other-medical-devices-reality-not-fiction/#772a34e34327)).
82.

Kostadinov, supranote 47.

83.
84.

Id.
Id.

85.
86.

Basu, supra note 81, at 3.
Kostadinov, supranote 47.

87.

Id.

88.
89.

Basu, supra note 81.
Leavitt, supra note 30, at 13.

90.
91.
92.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id
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how easily patient information (such as name, date of birth, and diagnosis) could
be extracted from the IMD. 93
All of these examples of how cyberattacks on IMDs can happen illustrate a
fundamental problem with implantable medical device technology.
As
convenience has been emphasized-for example, using wireless technology so
that telemetry may be collected from IMDs, stored to a server, and shared with
clinicians via PCs or even smartphones-security of the system is often
overlooked. As some researchers have pointed out, security needs to be a
concern from the concept phase through design, testing, and manufacture, and
include surveillance once a device is on the market. 94
As the examples discussed herein reveal, there are significant security
concerns posed by active cyberattacks. But there are other dangers besides
unauthorized changes to a device's settings or programming. There are risks
posed by electromagnetic interference, for example. In addition, a hacked device
could be deluged with so much extraneous and inappropriate communications
traffic that normal communications fail to reach it. 95 Or, repeated "attacks" that
repeatedly awaken a device from its "sleeping" state could be used to
prematurely drain the batteries and thereby significantly reduce the lifespan of an
IMD.
"Active" attacks, in other words, can take many forms besides
intercepting communications and modifying settings, tampering with or
disabling therapies, or even inducing shocks to a patient.96 Attacks could consist
of blocking messages, interrupting communications traffic, and even generating
new messages. 97
Moreover, an equal or even greater security threat is posed by "passive"
cyberattacks on IMDs, as will be discussed in greater detail.98 As some scholars
have observed, security threats against IMDs can be categorized using the
acronym "STRIDE." 99 "S" represents the risk of "spoofing", or attacks on
authentication, in which the attacker impersonates the programmer, an external
device or controller, or even the IMD itself. 00 The "T" stands for tampering, in
which communications are modified and/or the integrity of patient data is
compromised.10 1 "R" represents repudiation, in which repeated attempts at

93.

Id.

94.

See Camara et al., supranote 9, at 273 (discussing how security mechanisms should be a

concern from the design phase and "complemented with appropriate legal and administrative
measures.").
95. See Johannes Sametinger, et al., Security Challengesfor Medical Devices, 58 COMM. OF
THE ACM 74, 77 (Apr. 2015) (discussing how wireless attacks on cardiac pacemakers and
defibrillators can result in "denial-of-service" and other information tampering).
96. See Camara et al., supranote 9, at 278.
97. Id.
98. Id. (acknowledging how passive attackers pose a "serious compromise" of a patient's
privacy).
99. Id. at 277.
100. Id. at 277, Table 1.
101. Id
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access are made or access logs are deleted.1 02 "I" stands for information
disclosure, in which confidentiality is breached and medical information is
disclosed.103 "D" is for denial of service, in which the IMD is overwhelmed with
data, its battery drained, or its communication capabilities disrupted. 1 04 And "E"
represents the threat of elevation of privileges, in which a cyberattacker may
reprogram the IMD, alter the patient's therapy, or even shut off the device. 05
Naturally, some attacks may encompass multiple risks.106 And while extreme
"active" threats like reconfiguring a device's settings to administer a fatal
medication dose or a lethal volt may seem somewhat lower on the spectrum of
likely threats, so-called "passive" cyberattacks in which sensitive patient
information is compromised or stolen are a sobering and even more probable
reality.1 07

III. CYBERSECURITY MEASURES AND IMDs

As observers have noted and as medical device manufacturers themselves
have conceded, "Medical device manufacturers have a legal responsibility to 'be
vigilant and responsive' to security threats." 0 8 But improving security for IMDs
is problematic, since manufacturers must necessarily take utility-related factors
into account, such as usability, patient values, battery life and system
performance, and, of course, cost.1 9 Depending on the security measures
chosen, the additional security could impede system performance, for
instance. 110 Other approaches, like adding encryption, might require updates of
the software on certain IMDs and controllers." A more radical measure, on the
other hand, may demand completely new devices or components.11
For
example, healthcare providers or manufacturers implementing two-way
communications in IMD systems would need to replace unidirectional
equipment."
As IMDs become smaller, more functional, and ever more
complex, the challenge of making them secure becomes more daunting than
ever. In the end, to accommodate patient preferences in additional to meeting
the evolving realities of the technological landscape, manufacturers and

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.

107. Id. at 278-79 (citing Daniel Halperin, et al., Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac
Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses, COMPUT. SCI. DEP'T FACULTY
PUBL'N (2008)).
108. Maisel & Kohno, supranote 54, at 1164 (quoting Murray, Jr., supranote 60).
109. See Leavitt, supra note 30, at 14.

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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healthcare providers may need to implement different security measures in
different contexts. Here are some different approaches to cybersecurity and
IMDs.
A.

The ProprietaryApproach

In certain scenarios, taking a proprietary approach with one's device enables
that healthcare provider to narrow the challenge of security. For example,
although they don't comment on their techniques or specific security features, St.
Jude Medical Center facilities adopt a proprietary approach in order to secure
their IMDs.14 This includes the St. Jude Medical Accent RF pacemaker and the
15
St. Jude Medical Anthem RF cardiac-resynchronization-therapy pacemaker.
Such a "custom-tailored" measure may work for some, but not others. In
addition, any security measure that is unique to its manufacturer must keep in
mind how its different devices and different functionality could result in
different security needs.
An implanted insulin pump, for example, runs
continuously throughout the day and interacts with external components (like a
blood glucose monitor). 1 1 6 In pacemakers, however, all components are internal,
and there is less interaction. 1
B.

The Patient-CenteredApproach

According to research conducted at the University of Washington's ValueSensitive Design Research Lab, cardiac patients with IMDs preferred security
solutions that "warned of potential problems, didn't require them to do anything
inconvenient, and didn't call attention to their condition."" 8
User
authentication, such as the use of passwords, can provide a measure of security
from cyber threats while placing more responsibility in the hands of the patient,
and simultaneously reducing reliance on more "inconvenient" security measures.
There is a drawback, however; doctors who might not know the password would
be unable to control the IMDs in the event of an emergency in which the patient
was unconscious. Bracelets with the passwords on them are one option, but
patients lose medical alert bracelets all the time. One potential solution is to
have IMD-access passwords tattooed on patients in a discreet manner, such as a
barcode visible only under ultraviolet light. However, Tamara Denning with the
University of Washington's Value Sensitive Design Research Lab points out, a
11 9
number of the patients surveyed were resistant to the idea of tattoos.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id-
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The Heart-to-HeartApproach

One method for protecting IMDs from cyberattack can best be described as
encrypting the heart itself by using a heartbeat reading as a biometric
authentication to confirm that the individual trying to download data or access or
reprogram critical features of the IMD is an actual person authorized to do so
and in direct contact with the patient, not a remote hacker.12 This solution was
the result of collaboration between researchers at Rice University and the
security company RSA Laboratories in Cambridge, Massachusetts.12
In it, a
doctor holds a device against the patient's body, and the device reads the
patient's heartbeat and compares it to one relayed in a wireless signal from the
IMD itself, before confirming that the signals match.12 The wireless exchange
of the heartbeat signal is then encrypted, stymieing any attempt to hack into the
communications.1 2 3 This approach doesn't rely on registration of a biometric
reading; it simply checks that the signals are identical before medical personnel
gain access to the implant.14 This method avoids the cumbersome, timeconsuming process that might otherwise confront doctors or paramedics during
an emergency. Other security methods like relying on a password that could be
lost, stolen, or merely forgotten, "have the potential to endanger the lives of
patients in an emergency situation where authentication fails," according to
research scientist Shane Clark at BNN Technologies.15
The very nature of the human heart makes this security measure possible. It
produces a unique rhythm, so the "password" is different in each
measurement.126 Yet while, the electrocardiogram (ECG)-the graph depicted
through human heartbeats-shows up-and-down spikes common to each person,
the exact shape of ECG spikes varies from individual to individual. 127 Everyone
has his or her own unique shape, a trait that remains constant even during
changes in heart rate brought on by exercise or excitement. 12 The encryption
step is important, preventing a cyber attacker from hijacking a signal in order to
issue malicious directions.129 With the heart producing a stream of random bits
of information as medical personnel verify that they are getting the same signal
at the same time, researchers point out "the fact that you are reading a random

120. David Talbot, Encrypted Heartbeats Keep Hackers from Medical Implants, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519266/encrypted-heartbeats-keephackers-from-medical-implants/.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

126. Kostadinov, supranote 47.
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changing symbol means the attacker can't profile the heartbeat at one time and
use the information later to attack the device." 1 3 0
D.

The Firewall

Researchers at Princeton University and Purdue University, recognizing the
danger of hacking into IMDs like pacemakers and insulin-delivery systems,
found that most of the typical security solutions developed for other types of
computing platforms wouldn't work on medical devices because of factors like
battery constraints and the unique way in which IMDs are used.1 3 1 So they
developed a different approach-a firewall known as Medmon. 13 Similar to
how firewalls secure home or business computer networks by spotting and
blocking malicious traffic, Medmon "triggers response mechanisms that could
warn the user or jam the malicious communication."133 Medmon monitors all
communications to and from wireless medical devices in its vicinity, and uses
algorithms, such as multilayered anomaly detection, to identify malicious
communications.134 This could include, for example, physical anomalies in
which the abnormal characteristics of the wireless signal being intercepted
indicates the presence of danger-such as signals beyond a specific range or
coming at different intervals than normal traffic.
It would also include
behavioral anomalies in the form of things like suspicious commands or data
irregularities, such as when a command is attempted to administer multiple
136
dosages of medication or dosage beyond the accepted range.
In tests, the research team used Medmon to successfully guard against an
131
attack on a diabetic patient's glucose monitor and insulin pump.
While the
researchers envision building the Medmon firewall into a separate unit worn by a
patient with an IMD, or integrating it into mobile devices or wearable
technology like a smartphone or smartwatch, at the current time that is not
viable.
As the scientists point out, "this will require us to significantly reduce
13 9
the size of our prototype while increasing its energy efficiency."

130. Id.
131. Ania Monaco, Keeping Hackers out of ImplantedMedical Devices: Researchers Find a
Way to Prevent Attacks on Wireless Medical Equipment, INSTITUTE-IEEE (July 16, 2012),

http://theinstitute.ieee.org/technology-focus/technology-topic/keeping-hackers-out-of-implantedmedical-devices.
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134. Id.
135. Kostadinov, supranote 47.
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The Zero-PowerDefense

Another option explored by researchers addresses the concern of adding
more complex security features to IMDs that could jeopardize the device's
utility, because of the high rate at which they would consume the IMD's limited
battery life.140 In order to provide enhanced security without draining a device's
battery, scientists have suggested using an energy-harvesting computer as a
gateway device. 1 41 Those trying to communicate with an IMD, such as medical
personnel, power the gateway device with their own radio transmissions.142 The
gateway device then runs a challenge and response protocol, ensuring that only
authorized individuals are allowed to contact the IMD.143 Those who are
unauthorized, like cyber attackers, would be deterred at the1 4pateway stage,
preventing the IMD's limited battery power form being drained.
F.

Encryption

One of the most reliable cyber security measures is encryption.145
Historically, however, while some wireless medical devices use data encryption
and communicate over medical-grade band frequencies, most do not.146
Encryption capabilities add complexity and demand more system resources to
function properly, and many IMDs lack sufficient battery and computing power
to implement the sort of encryption algorithms that would be needed. 14 If this
approach were more workable, encryption could thwart hackers by hiding the
commands used by an IMD so that only authorized controllers could access
them.1 48
With any security measure considered, researchers and device manufacturers
have to balance security issues with other practical concerns, such as not
impeding the IMD's functionality or necessitating surgical removal and
replacement of the device. No single security method or mechanism is going to
provide sufficient security for every implanted medical device under every
circumstance. Until recently, the FDA has offered little in the way of guidance,
preferring to leave cyber security concerns to the medical device manufacturers

140. Leavitt, supra note 30, at 13.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

145. Data Encryption: Threats and Best Practices,TREND MIRCO (Oct. 2, 2014), http://blog.
trendmicro.com/data-encryption-threats-best-practices/.
146. Leavitt, supra note 30, at 13.
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themselves and the software engineering community.1 49 A key consideration,
and one that will ultimately require the collaboration of medical device
manufacturers, the cyber security community, and stronger guidance or
intervention from the FDA, will be to come up with a risk-based security
assessment that varies according to the criticality of a device's function and
according to the perceived threat of compromised security. For example, devices
with functions that are non-life-sustaining (such as cochlear implants) and are at
a low risk for security breach might require less stringent security protocols,
such as user authentication and data validation. On the other end of the
spectrum, devices with life-sustaining functions (like ICDs or insulin pumps)
with a heightened risk of security breaches would demand higher safeguards. In
other words, cyber security measures should be commensurate with the potential
risks to patients, and achieving a regulatory framework for medical device
security is critical to achieving this. However, as we shall see, the regulatory
response to concerns over cyber risks have been slow in coming for the IMD
community.
IV. PASSIVE CYBER ATTACKS AND IMDS
Passive cyberattacks focused on stealing patients' protected health
information (PHI) are likely to be the most common threats to IMDs. 5 o These
are often referred to as data breach cases, which are the most common form of
cybercrime.1 5 1 "A data security breach occurs when there is a loss or theft of, or
other unauthorized access to, sensitive personally identifiable information that
could result in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of
data." 1 52 In simple terms, a data breach occurs when sensitive information is
accessed on a computer and either taken or exposed.
It has become so
prevalent that it has its own proverb, "It is not a matter of if but when," 154 and
the mantra among most cybersecurity experts is that companies should "assume
breach," meaning they should assume that they have already had a data breach,

149. See Cybersecurity for Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: FDA Safety
Communication, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (June 13, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm356423.htm.
150. See Caleb Barlow, Attackers Shift Sights from Retail to Health Care in 2015, SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 24, 2015), https://securityintelligence.com/attackers-shift-sights-from-retailto-health-care-in-2015/.
151. See The 3 Most Common Types ofData Breaches -And How to Prevent Them, BEFORE
IT'S NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://beforeitsnews.com/financial-markets/2015/01/the-3most-common-types-of-data-breaches-and-how-to-prevent-them-2811718.html.
152. Gina Stevens, Data Security Breach Notification Laws, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (Apr. 10,
2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42475.pdf.

153. Id.
2,

154. Adam Greenberg, Plan Ahead: Preparefor the Inevitable Data Breach, SC MAG. (Sept.
2014), http://www.semagazine.com/plan-ahead-prepare-for-the-inevitable-data-breach/article/

366348.
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even if they do not know it.15 5 In the business world, companies fear data
breaches as one of their greatest threats according to the Association of
Corporate Counsel's recent survey of chief legal officers worldwide. 156
In 2014, people were inundated with so much news about data breaches that
they began to experience breach fatigue after hearing about data breaches
impacting retail giants like Target, Home Depot, Neiman Marcus, Sally Beauty,
and Michaels, and then closing out the with the drama surrounding North
Korea's cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment.1 57 If 2014 was the year of
the retail payment card data breach, then 2015 is the year of the healthcare data
breach.1 5' The trend in 2015 shows that hackers have begun to move away from
retail stores and toward attacking healthcare related organizations.1 59 The
reported U.S. retail data breaches fell 92% from 2014; however, healthcarerelated breaches were up from 7.8 million records exposed in 2014 to 99.6
million records in 2015.160 In fact, three of the top seven data breaches of 2015
were healthcare breaches, which included the Anthem breach, Premera Blue
Cross breach, and the Excellus BlueCross BlueShield breach. 1 61
On January 29, 2015, Premera Blue Cross and Premera Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Alaska learned of a cyberattack that occurred on May 5, 2014.162 The
attack resulted in a data breach of approximately 11 million records that included
medical records, Social Security numbers, and birth dates.163

155. Rafal Los, "Assume Breach" Is Not a Defeatist Point of View, NORSE: DARKMATTERS

(Feb.

2,

2015),

http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2015/02/02/assume-breach-is-not-a-defeatist-

point-of-view/; Michael Santarcangelo, 5 Questions to Ask Before a Breach Happens, CSO (Jan. 13,

2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2867291/security-leadership/5-questions-toask-before-a-breach-happens.html.
156. CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS 2015 SURVEY, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 4 (2015)
[hereinafter ACC SURVEY]; See Frank Strong, Q&A with Veta Richardson: ACC Chiefon Teaming

with Australia, BUSINESS OF LAW BLOG (Sept. 10, 2015), (citing ACC SURVEY, at 4),
http://businessoflawblog.com/2015/09/veta-richardson-acc/ ("Results from the ACC CLO 2015
Survey revealed 96% of GCs and CLOs rated compliance and ethics as the top issue keeping them
up at night, followed by data breaches and litigation (82% and 79% respectively)").
157. See Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2015, 7:06 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2015/01/13/the-big-data-breaches-of-2014/#531910a
13a48.
158. See Barlow, supranote 150.
159. Id.
160. Tom DiChristopher DataBreaches Down in Retail, but Soaring in Health Care, CNBC:

CYBERSECURITY (Dec. 24, 2015, 9:28 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/24/data-breaches-down92-in-retail-but-soaring-in-health-care-industry.html.
161. See Jessica Davis, 7 Largest Data Breaches of 2015, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Dec. 11,

2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/7-largest-data-breaches-2015.
162. Kate Vinton, Premera Blue Cross Breach May Have Exposed 11 Million Customers'

Medical and Financial Data, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2015, 6:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
katevinton/2015/03/17/11-million-customers-medical-and-financial-data-may-have-been-exposedin-premera-blue-cross-breach/#5f~b5a332143.
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On January 29, 2015, Anthem, Inc. learned of a cyberattack to its systems
that began in early December 2014.164 The attack resulted in a data breach that
exposed more than 80 million customer records, along with approximately 19
million rejected customers, all of whose information was exposed. 1 65 Amon the
Amon
information stolen was Social Security numbers, birth dates, and addresses.
On August 5, 2015, Excellus BlueCross BlueShield learned of a cyberattack
to its systems that began on December 23, 2013.1
The attack resulted in a data
breach that exposed more than 10 million records containing names, birth dates,
Social Security numbers, and mailing addresses, as well as financial account and
claims information.1 68
On May 5, 2015, UCLA Health determined that it had a cyberattack to its
systems that began as early as September 2014.169 The attack resulted in a data
breach that exposed 4.5 million records containing Social Security numbers,
medical data such as conditions, medications, procedures, and test results.170
In early February, 2015, CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield learned from
Anthem that some of CareFirst's members were impacted by the Anthem data
breach.1 7 1 The data breach exposed 1.1 million records compromised. 172
The primary reason hackers are focusing more on healthcare information is
because healthcare information is the most valuable.1 73 Hackers are usually
driven by money and there is more money to be made by stealing healthcare
records.1 7 4 According to the Ponemon Institute, stolen patient health records sell
for as much as $363 per record on the black market
compared to as little as

164. How to Access & Sign up for Identity Theft Repair & Credit Monitoring Services,
ANTHEM (May 8, 2015), http://www.anthemfacts.com/.
165. Zack Whittaker, These Companies Lost Your Data in 2015's Biggest Hacks, Breaches,
ZDNET (Jan. 13, 2016, 7:44 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-security-databreaches-2015/.
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170. Whittaker, supranote 165.
171. Updated CareFirstBluecross BlueShield Statement Regarding Anthem Data Breach,
CAREFIRST (Feb. 12, 2015), https://member.carefirst.com/individuals/news/media-news/2015/
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Records, WIRED (Sept. 10, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-healthinsurance-firm-excellus-says-attackers-breached-1Om-records/.
173. See Hackers Selling HealthcareData in the Black Market, INFOSEC INST. (Jul. 27, 2015),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/
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$.50 for payment card records.17 6 There are several reasons for this disparity in
value. First, the shelf life of healthcare information is much longer than other
forms of information and is rich enough for identity theft. 7
"Social Security
numbers can't easily be cancelled, and medical and prescription records are
permanent. There's also a large market for health insurance fraud and abuse,
which may be more lucrative than simply selling the records outright in
forums." 7 8
On the other hand, it is difficult to monetize stolen cards and many of the
cards never generate any money for a variety of reasons.1 7 9 Payment card data
expires very quickly-usually at or near the time the consumer learns her
information has been breached.180 Supply and demand also plays a big factor.
Payment card information is the most common stolen data and, after a big data
breach, it gets even worse because the market is flooded with many new card
numbers that drive down the price of cards that are already for sale. 8 1 Add to
this that larger retailers have made significant strides in improving their
cybersecurity defensesl82 and it makes for a perfect scenario for hackers to focus
on attacking IMDs for access to healthcare records.
While active cyberattacks on IMDs evoke more intrigue and suspense,
hackers who are in it to make money, as most are, will likely focus on passive
cyberattacks that enable them to steal healthcare information.
IMDs will
prove valuable to these hackers for a couple of reasons. First, the IMDs
themselves will contain healthcare information on the device.184 Second, they
are essentially tiny computerized devices that are connected to the computer
networks of healthcare organizations as part of the Internet of Things, providing
an entry point into such networks. The later will likely be the most common
method of cyberattacks on IMDs.
Hackers are very skillful at learning how to evade companies' security
measures that are designed to keep them out and have adopted three key
principles taught by the ancient military leader Sun Tzu: (1) "In all fighting the

176. Benjamin Dean, Your Stolen Credit CardData Is Probably Worth Only 50 Cents on the
Black Market, THE WEEK (Feb. 11, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/535818/stolen-credit-carddata-probably-worth-only-50-cents-black-market.
177. See Hackers Selling, supra note 173.
178. Fahmida Y. Rashid, Why Hackers Want Your Health CareData Most ofAll, INFOWORLD
(Sept.
14, 2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2983634/security/why-hackers-want-yourhealth-care-data-breaches-most-of-all.html.
179. See Dean, supranote 176.
180. See Barlow, supra note 150.
181. Raj Samuel, What Is Your Customer Data Worth?, INTEL SECURITY: EXECUTIVE PERSP.
BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015), https://blogs.meafee.com/executive-perspectives/customer-data-worth/.
182. See Barlow, supra note 150.
183. See Jess White, Why Medical Device Security Should Be Top Priority, HEALTHCARE
Bus. & TECH. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.healthcarebusinesstech.com/medical-device-security/.
184. See Kevin Fu, Reducing Risks ofImplantable Medical Devices, 52 COMM. OF THE ACM
25,
25
(2009),
http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2009/6/28489-reducing-risks-of-implantablemedical-devices/fulltext.
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direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
to secure victory." 1 5 (2) "You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you
attack places which are not defended." 18 6 (3) "The spot where we intend to fight
must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a
possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in
many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be
proportionately few." 87 Demonstrating these principles, hackers have learned
that most companies focus their resources on securing their own networks but
focus very little on examining the networks of their business associates and other
third parties that they allow to access their networks. 88 Consider the following
examples:
Most people are aware that hackers attacked Target and caused a massive
data breach of its customers' payment card information during the Holiday
Season in 2013.189
Most people, however, have never heard of Fazio
Mechanical.1 90 Fazio was a third-party vendor for Target that provided HVAC
services to some of its stores.1 91 Unable to gain access to Target's network
directly, the hackers sent a phishing email to an employee of Fazio that installed
Citadel, a password-stealing bot, onto Fazio's computers.192 The Citadel bot
then obtained Fazio's login credentials for Target's Ariba vendor portal and used
the credentials to gain entry into Target's internal network, took control of its
servers and then infiltrated its point-of-sale systems which enabled it to steal its
cardholder information to sell on the black market.1 93
Cybersecurity experts investigating a cyberattack against an oil company
learned that, after the attackers were unable to gain access to the company's
network directly, they tried a unique method of indirect attack.1 94 They learned
that the company's employees regularly ordered from a Chinese restaurant near
the company's office and then infected with malware the online menu for the
restaurant. 9 5 When the workers viewed restaurant's online menu, they

185. See White, supranote 183.
186. Shawn E. Tuma, What Did Sun Tzu Teach About Data Security, CYBERSECURITY Bus. L.
BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://shawnetuma.com/2014/03/28/what-did-sun-tzu-teach-about-datasecurity/.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Natalie Gagliordi, The Target Breach Two Years Later, ZDNET (Nov. 27, 2015, 3:00
PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/the-target-breach-two-years-later/.
194. Id.
195. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Lurking in Vents and Soda Machines, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/technology/the-spy-in-the-soda-machine.html?ref=
technology&_r=1.
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inadvertently downloaded the malicious code that gave the attackers an entrypoint into the company's computer network.196
Hackers have already medical devices in this manner to gain access into
hospital's networks. 197 Similar to Fazio in the Target example, hackers have
learned that while healthcare organizations commit significant resources to
securing what is viewed as their traditional network environment, they are not
able to secure many of the devices within that environment.1 98 Most of the
traditional security solutions they customarily deploy do not apply on the device
level. 199 The devices are treated as a "black box" that they do not have the
ability to access.200 They are unable to install their security suites on the devices
and, in the event a device becomes compromised, it can take a long time to
remediate and they can be re-infected fairly quickly.2 01 Worse yet, these devices
are then allowed behind the organizations' firewalls so, if they can be
compromised, then whoever is behind it is already within the organizations'
"secure" network environment.2 02
The cybersecurity firm TrapX researched attacks on hospitals that exploited
an attack vector for medical device hijack, which the researchers called
"MEDJACK."203 TrapX discovered that these devices were the hospitals'
"weakest link in the chain" because of the threat they posed.204 The biggest
problem with these devices is that they are "closed devices" which means
security teams cannot evaluate them.205 Also, many of the devices run out-ofdate operating systems with known vulnerabilities such as Windows 2000 or
Windows XP.2
The firm found a litany of malware infected devices in three
separate hospitals.2 07 While these infected medical devices, some of which are
discussed below, were not implanted medical devices, there is no reason to
208
believe IMDs will not use those as well, as IMDs become more prevalent.
Consider the following examples of attacks on hospitals that were facilitated by
exploiting medical devices:

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Steve Ragan, Attackers TargetingMedical Devices to Bypass HospitalSecurity, CSO

(June 4, 2015 3:49 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2931474/data-breach/attackerstargeting-medical-devices-to-bypass-hospital-security.html.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Darlene Storm, MEDJACK: Hackers HijackingMedical Devices to Create Backdoors in
Hospital Networks, COMPUTERWORLD (Jun. 8, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.computerworld.
corn/article/2932371 /cybercrime-hacking/medjack-hackers-hijacking-medical-devices-to-createbackdoors-in-hospital-networks.html.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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Hackers infected a blood gas analyzer in a hospital that otherwise had
deployed a very strong industry suite of cyber defense products.209 The security
suite did not detect that an attack had occurred; however, TrapX discovered that
the attackers had infiltrated the network and were moving throughout the
network via three malware-infected blood gas analyzers that had effectively
created backdoors into the hospital network.21 The attackers used this access to
extract confidential data, causing a data breach, and also used their access to run
password-sniffing programs.21
TrapX discovered that the confidential
information was unencrypted and, once the attackers had access through the
backdoor created by the device, they had virtual free reign to manipulate the
data.212
An end-user in a hospital was surfing the Internet and visited a malicious
website which deployed malware that allowed hackers to gain access to the
hospital's network. 213 The hospital had the same cyber defenses as the previous
hospital,21 4 yet the hackers were able to gain this access through the radiology
department's picture archive and communications system to gain unfettered
access to the network which enabled it to search the network looking for other
215
targets to attack.
The radiology department used the picture archive and
communications system for storing and accessing images from multiple
sources.216 The hackers were able to use their access to infect a key nurse's
workstation and extract confidential information to Guiyang, China.217
In another attack, hackers targeted the hospital's X-ray systems and infected
it with advanced malware.218 The malware served as a backdoor into the
hospital's computer network. 2 19 This backdoor could then be used to launch an
attack within the hospital that would exfiltrate healthcare data from the hospital
and be difficult to diagnose and remediate.22 0
It is reasonable to expect the vast majority of passive cyberattacks on IMDs
to be for the purpose of stealing healthcare information to monetize it by selling
it on the black market.221 Hackers may, however, find ways to profit by
obtaining such data and using it for extortion, as has been attempted with hacks
of non-healthcare information.222

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

213. Ragan, supra note 198.

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Storm, supra note 203.

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See White, supranote 183.
222. See, e.g., David Bisson, The Ashley Madison Hack-A Timeline, TRIPWIRE (Sept. 1,
2015), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-ashley-
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An example of this is how hackers attempted to leverage the data breach of
Ashley Madison, the company with the business slogan of, "Life is short. Have
an affair," and caters to married people who are interested in committing
adultery.22 The hackers did not attempt to sell the information they obtained;
rather, they offered to keep it confidential for a "price."2 2 4 On July 19, 2015, a
story revealed a group of hackers known as The Impact Team had published 40
MB of sensitive internal data stolen from Ashley Madison's parent company,
Avid Life Media (ALM).225 The data included customers' credit cards and ALM
226
internal documents.
The hackers issued a statement threatening to release the
details of 37 million users of Ashley Madison unless the company agreed to their
price which was that it permanently shut down the site.227 The company refused
and, on August 18, 2015, the hackers released a data dump containing all 37
million users of Ashley Madison's account details including names, passwords,
addresses, phone numbers, and credit card transactions from activities on the
site, as well as the users' sexual preferences.228 The hackers had subsequent data
dumps, one of which included emails revealing that the company's CEO cheated
229
on his wife and attempted to have affairs with at least three other women.
The
saga continued and, as a result of ALM's refusal to comply with the hackers'
demand, multiple lawsuits have been filed, potentially-related suicides occurred,
incalculable marital strife and likely divorces have occurred, ALM's CEO
resigned and, perhaps worst of all for the company, it was revealed that very few
real females ever engaged on the site.2 3 0
The hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment is another example of hackers
231
On November 21, 2014, an email was sent
using a data breach for extortion.
to Sony Pictures' CEO, Chairman, and other company executives that demanded
"Pay the damage, or Sony Pictures will be bombarded as a whole." 232 Three
days later, on November 24, 2014, Sony Pictures was bombarded with a
cyberattack that left the company decimated and resulted in unreleased movies
233
and a trove of internal company documents being made public.
Included

madison-hack-a-timeline/ ("The Impact Team issued "a statement threatening to release the
sensitive details of all 37 million users of Ashley Madison Unless ALM permanently shuts down
the website.").
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai & Christina Warren, Hackers Sent Extortion Email to
SONY Executives 3 Days Before Attack, MASHABLE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/12/
08/hackers-emailed-sony-execs/#bmHDaaQRuEq6.

232. Id.
233. See Steven Musil, Sony Hack's Invasion of Privacy Still Grates on CEO, CNET (Oct. 6,
2015), http://www.cnet.com/news/sony-hacks-invasion-of-privacy-still-grates-on-ceo/.
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among these documents were the private emails of the company's CEO, Michael
Lynton.234 Included among these emails were embarrassing exchanges between
Lynton and Amy Pascal, the company's then-Chair that eventually led to her
-235

resignation.
Considering the examples of Ashley Madison and Sony Pictures
Entertainment, hackers may be willing to use the same strategy by hacking into
IMDs to obtain sensitive healthcare information stored on the device and using it
for extortion. It does not take much of an imagination to envision a scenario
where someone running for a high-level public office, whose health may be in
question, would want to carefully guard such information. If such a person had
an IMD that stored that kind of information, a hacker who was able to hack into
the device and collect information could find herself in a position to make quite a
profit by not revealing the information if she found a willing buyer.
While it is impossible to envision all of the ways that hackers will find to
hack into and take advantage of IMDs, one thing is certain: if there is money to
be made in hacking, the law of supply and demand will ensure there will be
economic incentive for the hacks to continue.
V.

CIVIL LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS FOR

IMDs

Given the prevalence of data breach as being the most likely type of risk for
IMDs, it makes sense to begin with a look at civil liability as it pertains to data
breach cases. Virtually every significant data breach results in a multitude of
236
lawsuits being filed against the company that was breached.
It is no different
with the numerous healthcare organizations that had data breaches in 2015;
however, those cases are still in their infancy. These cases are analogous to the
lawsuits predominantly against retail companies that have been making their way
through the courts for the last few years.2 37 To determine the civil liability
implications for data breaches caused by IMDs, it is important to look at how
courts have handled the cases stemming from consumer retail breaches.
In situations where there has been a breach of consumer information, it is
almost inevitable that class-action lawsuits will be filed against the company or
entity that owned or licensed the data subjects' information that was subject of
the breach.2 3 8

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See generally Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015)
(class action lawsuit brought by customers whose credit card numbers were stolen during a
cyberattack); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 2015 WL 3466943 (D. Nev. June 1, 2015) (consumers brought
lawsuit after their personal information was stolen after a security breach); Hammond v. The Bank

of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 2010 WL 2643307 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (lawsuit brought by consumers
whose personal identification information was stolen).

237. See id.
238. See generally id. (lawsuits initiated after personal information was stolen through security
breaches).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol67/iss3/8

26

Browning and Tuma: If Your Heart Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurit
IF YOUR HEART SKIPS A BEAT

2016]

663

Historically, plaintiffs in these cases have had a difficult time prevailing
given the uncertainty surrounding how information was taken in a data breach
scenario, which makes showing the actual harm resulting from the data subject
239
difficult to prove as it relates to standing.
Plaintiffs in a lawsuit are required to
claim.240 In order to meet this
their
of
element
essential
an
as
prove standing
burden, they must prove they have "suffered a concrete and particularized injury
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by
favorable judicial decision."2 41 This requires plaintiffs to show they have either
suffered actual harm, or that they will suffer future harm to a sufficient degree to
confer standing.242
Because consumer data breach cases are primarily premised on the
plaintiffs' concern that their personal information will be used to commit fraud
against them in the future, such claims are generally couched as a future harm
that has not yet occurred, which will be the same analysis when dealing with
243
healthcare information.
Concerns about what may happen in the future are
necessarily unpredictable and, thus, the issue of standing has proved to be
problematic for plaintiff consumer data breach litigation cases where the
244
plaintiffs have not already suffered actual cognizable harm.
The year 2015
marked what, at first blush, appeared to be a watershed moment in the
development of this body of jurisprudence with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group,
24 5

LL C.

For several years courts looked to the United States Supreme Court's
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'1 USA 2 46 decision for guidance on the standing issue in
247
cases premised on allegations of future harm.
In Clapper, the Court set forth
248
the framework for this analysis.
To satisfy this framework, an injury must be
'concrete, particularized and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling."' 2 49 For a threatened
injury to satisfy this requirement it "'must be certainly impending to constitute

239.
Arkansas,
240.
241.
242.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Whitmore v.
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
Id. at 561.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 564 n.2.

243. See Dana Post, Plaintiffs Alleging Only "Future Harm" Following a Data Breach
Continue to Face a High Bar, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Jan. 28, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/
plaintiffs-alleging-only-future-harm-following-a-data-breach-continue-to-fa.

244. See In re Zappos.com, 2015 WL 3466943, at 4; Hammond, 2010 WL 2643307, at 8.
245. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
246. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
247. See In re Zappos.com, 2015 WL 3466943, at 4 (noting a division between courts on what
constitutes sufficient injury to establish standing in data breach cases due to Clapper).
248. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561

U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
249. Id
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injury in fact," and .'[a]llegations of possible future injury' are not sufficient." 2 5 0
However, the Court also noted that regarding allegations of future injury, its
cases "do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain
that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, [the Court]
[has] found standing based on a 'substantial risk' that the harm will occur, which
may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur cost to mitigate or avoid that harm." 2 5 1
According to Clapper, there is a continuum where future harm cases must
fall somewhere between a substantial risk that the harm will occur, on the low
252
side, and that it must be certainly impending, as the preferred standard.
Prior
to Remijas, many courts focused on the certainly impending standard, which
they found too high for consumer data breach cases to satisfy.253
The district court in Remi/as followed this trend and granted Neiman
254
Marcus' Motion to Dismiss.
The facts of Remijas have since proved to be
very important. During the 2013 holiday shopping season, Neiman Marcus
learned that fraudulent charges had shown up on some of its customers' payment
255
cards and began an investigation.
On January 1, 2014, Neiman Marcus
discovered potential malware and its computer systems and, on January 10,
256
The malware gathered
2014, publicly disclosed that it had a data breach.
payment card information between July 16, 2013, and October 30, 2013, during
which time 350,000 cards were potentially exposed.257 Of those cards, 9,200
were known to have been used fraudulently.25 Multiple class-action lawsuits
were filed and consolidated into one action whereby Remijas, and others, sought
to represent the class of 350,000 other customers whose data may have been
breached. 2 5 9 The complaint asserted the following causes of action: negligence,
breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive business
practices, invasion of privacy, and violation of multiple state data breach laws.260
Neiman Marcus moved to dismiss the case and the District Court granted the
261
262
motion, finding a lack of standing.
The plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the facts of the case to
determine whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged "that the data breach
inflicted concrete, particularized injury on them; that Neiman Marcus caused,

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
Id. at 1150 n.5 (quoting Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 153-55).
Id.
See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654-55

(standing was not satisfied when personal information was stolen since they could not prove that the
harm was "certainly impending").

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
Id
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that injury and that a judicial decision can provide redress for them." 2 63 The
court examined Clapper and focused on the minimal substantial risk of harm
discussed in footnote 5 thereof, which had also been applied by a district court in
In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litigation.264 It found that, unlike most data
breach cases that were premised on speculation about whether the data had
actually been stolen and how it would be used, the facts of this case were
265
different.
The court found that, considering how early in the case it was, it
was plausible for the plaintiff to show a substantial risk of harm based on two
266
First, the court asked "[w]hy else would hackers break into a store's
key facts.
database and steal consumers' private information? Presumably, the purpose of
the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those
consumers' identities."2 67 Second, the court observed that while 9,200 of the
cards had experienced fraudulent charges so far, fraudulent charges for other
cards could occur long after a data breach.268 For these reasons, the court found
269
the allegations were sufficient to survive a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.
Many commentators viewed Remijas as being the turning point for
consumer data breach litigation cases where courts would find standing existed
in cases where hackers had intentionally stolen consumers' private information,
based on the court's rhetorical question and answer in the opinion. 27 0 The
floodgates have not opened, as was expected. In the consumer data breach cases
that have followed, however, what we have seen is less of a major turning point
and more of a maturation of courts' understanding and analysis of these cases.
Two cases provide an excellent example of this point in how they address
the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Remijas. The case Whalen v. Michael Stores

Inc.,271 stems from a data breach of Michael's and Aaron Brothers stores in
which hackers used malware to obtain information from 2.6 million payment
272
cards.
The information obtained was limited and did not include customer
information such as names, addresses, or PIN numbers.273 A class-action lawsuit
was filed and plaintiff Mary Jane Whalen sought to represent herself and the

263. Id. at 692.
264. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1217 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
265. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F.
Supp. 3d at 1214).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 693-94.
269. Id. at 694.
270. "Why else would hackers break into a store's database and steal consumers' private
information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers' identities." Id. at 693.
271. See Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., No. 14-CV-7006 (JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 9462108
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015).
272. See Whalen, 2015 WL 9462108, at 1.
273. Id.
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other customers whose data may have been breached.27 4 The complaint asserted
causes of action for breach of implied contract and violations of New York
General Business Law § 349.27 Michael's moved to dismiss the case and the
District Court granted the motion, finding a lack of standing.26
The Whalen Court found the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm277 and, in
deciding on the adequacy of the alleged threat of future harm, looked beyond the
number of payment cards that were breached and the hackers' likely motives.28
Instead, it looked at the existing objective manifestations of harm to gauge the
likelihood that future harm would occur in deciding whether the plaintiff met the
burden of showing a substantial risk that future harm will occur.29 Based upon
this information, the court found that Whalen had "failed to allege an injury that
is 'certainly impending' or based on a 'substantial risk that the harm will
occur."'2 80 The court observed that it had been nearly 2 years since the data
breach and plaintiff still have not experienced any fraudulent charges.281
Comparing this to the RemJas decision, the court found "one critical distinction
in [RemJas] is that 9,200 of those customers experienced fraudulent charges
following the breach. By contrast, Whalen's Complaint only indicates that she
was affected, and even she did not suffer any out-of-pocket losses." 2 82

Shortly after Whalen was the case In re Super Valu, Inc., 2 8 3 which stems
from two data breaches of numerous SuperValu and AB Acquisition stores in
which hackers used malware to obtain information from over 1,000 store
locations, 284 though the number of customers affected is not mentioned in the
opinion. The hackers obtained the information embedded in the magnetic strip
of the payment cards, which included cardholder names, account numbers,
expiration dates, and PINS.285 Multiple class-action lawsuits were consolidated
in this action which asserted causes of action for negligence, negligence per se,
breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of various state
consumer protection and data breach notification laws.286 SuperValu moved to

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 3 ("Whalen has not alleged that she suffered any unreimbursed charges. To the
contrary, she asserts only that her credit card was 'physically presented for payment in
Ecuador.'. . . There are no allegations that Whalen was required to pay the charges made in
Ecuador.").
278. Id. at 4-5.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 5 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792 (D. Minn.
2016).
284. Id. at 1-2.
285. Id. at 1.
286. Id-
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dismiss the case and the District Court granted the motion, finding a lack of
standing.287
The SuperValu Court found the plaintiffs had not suffered actual harm288
and, similar to the Whalen Court, in deciding on the adequacy of the alleged
threat of future harm, looked at the existing objective manifestations of harm to
gauge the likelihood that future harm would occur in deciding whether the
plaintiff met the burden of showing a substantial risk that future harm would
occur.289 Despite the occurrence of cardholder data breaches from over 1,000
stores, the only alleged misuse of any of the plaintiff s information was a single
290
unauthorized charge on one of the plaintiffs credit cards.
The plaintiff
cancelled the card and did not allege that the charge was unreimbursed or that he
incurred bank fees or other monetary losses related to the charge. 2 91 No other
plaintiff alleged they had incurred any unauthorized charges of that they had
experienced any identity theft or attempted identity theft following the data
292
breach.
The court found the plaintiffs' allegations that they had spent time
dealing with the data breach or opening and closing accounts, as well as that
their privacy was breached, insignificant and did not provide adequate
standing.293
The real question before the court was whether the plaintiffs' adequately
294
The SuperValu Court looked to other
alleged a substantial risk of future harm.
data breach cases where the plaintiffs' data has not been misused following the
breach and found "the vast majority of courts [in those cases] have held that the
risk of future identity theft or fraud is too speculative to constitute an injury in
fact for purposes of Article III standing."2 95 The court explained that the
speculative nature of such a threatened injury stemmed from many variables
including uncertainty about what the hacker did with the information, intends to
296
do with the information, or is able to do with the information.
Another such
variable is when such future harm may materialize and the amount of time since
the breach occurred, with the increase in time indicating that the threat of harm is
becoming less likely.2 9 7 In this case, the data breach affected more than 1,000
retail stores and occurred nearly one and a half years earlier yet there was only
one isolated instance of an unauthorized charge.298 The court found this is not

287. See id.
288. See id. at 5.
289. See id. at 5 (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 8.
294. See id. at 3 (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5).
295. Id. at 4.
296. See id. at 5 (citing Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)).
297. Id. at 5 (citing In re Zappos.com, Inc., 2015 WL 3466943 at 8 (D. Nev. 2015); Storm v.
Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 367 (M.D. Pa. 2015)).
298. Id. at 5.
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indicative of data misuse that is fairly traceable to the data breach.2 99 The court
distinguished Remijas on the basis that it "included factual allegations of
substantial data misuse which plausibly suggested that the hackers had
succeeded in stealing the data and were willing and able to use it for future theft
or fraud."3 00
This line of cases demonstrates the maturation in the courts' analysis of data
breach cases to determine whether the plaintiffs legitimately sustained an injury
or whether there is a substantial risk of future harm by looking carefully to
determine whether there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that such future
harm would occur. They do this by looking at the nature of the breach, the
information that was obtained, how much time has elapsed since the breach, and
most importantly, whether there has been any actual situations where the
information has been used for fraud or identity theft.301 In cases involving
breaches of healthcare information, this level of analysis will be very important
because of the sensitivity of the information and, perhaps more importantly, its
increased shelf life when compared to financial cardholder information.
In terms of contractual liability, the strong trend is for business to business
transactions to now address and allocate responsibility for cybersecurity issues
and data breacheS. 302 It is likely that the contracts dealing with IMDs will also
address such risks-and allocate such responsibility-and they should.
Officer and director liabilityProduct of lack of success on consumer class actions
Look at the nature of the harm-it happens immediately upon the breach
Caremark-prohibits company indemnification
The latter part of 2015 saw two cases that furthered the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
respective roles in regulating cybersecurity.3 0 3
In August 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
304
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. , ruled that the FTC has the authority to
regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of section 45(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)30s, and that companies have fair notice that

299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 5.
See David C. Lashway, Cybersecurity Disputes in Contract Negotiation and Data
Processing, SECURITY ROUND TABLE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.securityroundtable.org/
cybersecurity-disputes-in-contract-negotiation-and-data-processing/.
303. Shawn Tuma, Managing Cyber & Security Risks, ETHICAL BOARDROOM, Winter 2016, at

116, 117, https://issuu.com/ethicalboardroom/docs/ethical boardroom winter 2016 editi/ 117
304. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
305. Id- at 248-249.
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their specific cybersecurity practices could fall short.3 06 The FTC brought this
action against Wyndham following three data breaches that Wyndham had
between 2008 and 2009 due to its rudimentary cybersecurity posture that the
FTC alleged contravened the recommendations in its 2007 guidebook,
Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business.307 Wyndham argued
that the FTC lacked the authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness
prong of the FTC Act
and argued that it did not have fair notice that its
specific cybersecurity practices could fall short of that provision.
in August 2015 found both of these arguments to be without merit.

309

The ruling

Even before having its authority confirmed, the FTC had taken an aggressive
approach in pursuing one company, LabMD, for cybersecurity issues.
In
November 2015, the FTC's own Chief Administrative Law Judge ordered the
FTC to dismiss its Complaint in the case FTC v. LabMD because the FTC was
unable to provide evidence that any consumer had suffered any injury from what
it alleged were LabMD's unfair acts or practices. The FTC has since appealed
this decision and continues its pursuit of LabMD.
The FTC originally opened its investigation into LabMD in 2010, based on
information provided to it by a cybersecurity forensics firm that regularly
provided information to the FTC. The incident arose when one of LabMD's
employees was using LimeWire, a peer-to-peer file sharing program for sharing
music and videos, on the company's computer network without authorization.
The firm was able to use LimeWire to gain access to one file from LabMD's
network that contained protected information of its customers. Once it obtained
this information, the firm contacted LabMD and offered to "remediate" this issue
for the sum of $40,000. When LabMD refused to pay, the firm sent the
information to the FTC, which used it to pursue LabMD. Due to the disruption,
expense, and negative publicity of the FTC's case against it, LabMD went out of
business in 2014. Despite that, and despite the fact that the single file that the
cybersecurity forensics firm obtained from LabMD, through LimeWire, was
never exposed to anyone beyond that firm, an expert witness, and the FTC itself,
the FTC continues to pursue LabMD.
In September 2015, the SEC established its role in regulating cybersecurity.
In SEC v. R.T Jones Capital Equities Management, the SEC brought an
enforcement action against R.T. Jones for violating the "safeguards rule" of Rule
30(a) of Regulation S-P of the Securities Act of 1933. During a four-year period

306. Id. at 259.
307. Id. at 241.
308. Id. at 244-247.
309. Id- at 249.
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when R.T. Jones did not have cybersecurity-focused policies and procedures,
hackers accessed more than 100,000 of its clients' records. No individuals
reported financial harm, however, the SEC assessed a $75,000 penalty based on
this standard: "Firms must adopt written policies to protect their clients' private
information and they need to anticipate potential cybersecurity events and have
clear procedures in place rather than waiting to react once a breach occurs."
Certainly cyberattacks that result in the breach of patient health information
are the most likely source of civil liability, and the source that attracts the most
attention from legal observers.3 10 However, there are other potential sources of
statutory liability to consider, such as 21 C.F.R. § 820.30(g), which mandates
design controls. 1
Manufacturers who fail to consider cybersecurity measures
may run afoul of this statute.312 On the common law liability front, claims of
both strict liability and negligence are likely fallout for a device manufacturer in
the wake of a cyberattack.3 1 3 There will inevitably be failure-to-warn claims
against the device manufacturer, and potentially negligence claims against the
hospital and treating physicians as well.314 As to the latter, one would expect the
learned intermediary doctrine developed in most jurisdictions to be applicable as
a defense.
Two potential defenses available to a medical device manufacturer in the
event of an attack pertain to the attack itself, and to the technology involved. In
the event of a cyberattack, the liability of the hacker himself should be
considered: first, as a defense to causation (the criminal actor, not the alleged
design flaw in the device, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff s injury), and
second, for purposes of apportioning liability. With regard to the technology
itself, it may prove difficult for a plaintiff to successfully argue that, after
considering the risk of attack versus the utility of a life-saving device, that
prohibitive costs or measures that impair the usefulness of a device (such as
draining the battery) are worthwhile. Moreover, as technology continues to
advance by leaps and bounds, the question of "state of the art" becomes relevant.
Should a device manufacturer be held to a higher standard due to recent
innovation? Is it even possible to consider such a technological advance a

310. See. e.g., Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattack on Medical Devices and Hospital
Networks: Local Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 159

(2014).
311. 21 C.F.R. § 820.30(g).
312. See, generally, J.M. Porup, Why Aren't There Better Cybersecurity Regulations for
Medical Devices?, MOTHERBOARD, (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/
why-arent-there-better-cybersecurity-regulations-for-medical-devices (noting how there is a federal

regulation for the design of medical devices but not yet a federal regulation that mentions
cybersecurity testing).
313. See Ryder Lee, Is a MedicalDevice Cyber Vulnerability a Design Defect, LAW 360 (Oct.
16,
2015,
4:09
PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/715386/is-a-medical-device-cybervulnerability-a-design-defect.
314. Id.
315. Id-
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feasible and safer alternative design, after balancing risk/utility considerations?
At least one observer has argued that any analysis should "begin and end with
the manufacturer's compliance with published FDA and DHS security standards
at the time of manufacture," with government-published regulations serving "to
establish a bright-line standard of care for both manufacturers and defendant
health care providers for actions claiming inadequate cybersecurity leading to
harm."3 1 6
VI.

REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AND RESPONSE

The Food and Drug Administration's history of addressing the cybersecurity
risks associated with implanted medical devices is, despite its mandate, a brief
one. In fact, a legitimate criticism could be levied that up until very recently, the
FDA was more concerned about cybersecurity measures interfering with an
IMD's utility. For example, in 2014 the FDA alerted manufacturers that
cybersecurity measures should not "unreasonably hinder" a device's function. 1
As far back as August 2012, the General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a
report to Congress recommending that the FDA expand its consideration of data
security issues for IMDs." The report noted that while the FDA had considered
information security risks during premarket reviews39 of two devices in 2001
and 2006, the FDA had only looked at unintentional threats for four of the eight
areas the GAO had already selected for evaluation-software testing, verification,
and validation; risk assessments; access control; and contingency planning.32
What the FDA had not done, according to the GAO report, was consider the risk
of intentional threats for any of these areas.32 Moreover, the GAO noted, the
FDA had not considered either intentional or unintentional threats in areas such
as risk management, patch and vulnerability management, technical audit and
accountability, or security-incident-response activities.322 In the FDA's
comments to the report, it indicated that "it [did not] consider information
security risks from intentional threats . . . until recently."3 2 3

316. Id.
317. U.S. FOOD & DRUG Ass'N, CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG

ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014), www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationand
guidance/guidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf
318. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-816, FDA SHOULD EXPAND ITS
CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF DEVICES (2012).

319. The "FDA reviews manufacturers' applications to market medical devices during its
premarket review process and it monitors devices, once it has approved them, through its post
market efforts." Id.

320.
321.
322.
323.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id-
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The GAO report commented on the research that had demonstrated the
324
vulnerability of IMDs to both unintentional and intentional threats.
it
concluded that "[i]nformation security risks resulting from certain threats and
vulnerabilities could affect the safety and effectiveness of medical devices.
These risks include unauthorized changes of device settings resulting from a lack
of appropriate access controls."325 The GAO report also examined the
postmarket efforts that the FDA had in place to identify cybersecurity risks. 326 it
concluded that while the FDA had implemented such postmarket efforts,
including an "adverse event reporting system," the agency faced certain
challenges in using its postmarket measures to identify information security or
cyber risk problems. 321 One of these challenges was the fact that cybersecurity
concerns for IMDs were "a relatively new issue;" another was that the adverse
event reporting system was dependent upon reports submitted by manufacturers,
who are more focused on clinical risks than cybersecurity. 328
The GAO's concerns echoed the findings of private medical researchers
critical of the FDA's postmarket surveillance as a means of identifying security
and privacy risks.329 The July 2012 study by leading IMD cybersecurity
researcher Kevin Fu and others from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst,
Harvard Medical School, and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center analyzed
publicly available databases maintained by the FDA, including the agency's own
enforcement reports, device recalls, and the MAUDE 3 3 0 database of adverse
event reports.3 3 1 Noting the lack of reported events relating to privacy or
security, even after using search terms like "patient data issue," the researchers
concluded that the FDA's "classification of postmarket events may not be wellpositioned to prospectively collect security or privacy related problems."332 The
report also observed that "no effective system exists to detect signals of security
or privacy problems.
Dr. Fu and his colleagues recommended not only that
the FDA should "design postmarket systems that enable effective collection of
cybersecurity threat indicators for medical devices," but also that it should
improve its "premarket evaluation of security and privacy elements" of IMDs. 334
Faced with rebukes from the GAO and experts in cybersecurity and IMDs,
the FDA and other governmental entities have stepped up their game. In 2013,

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

329. See Daniel B. Kramer et al., Security and Privacy Qualities of Medical Devices: An
Analysis of FDA Postmarket Surveillance, PLOS ONE (July, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/

plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0040200.
330. Id.
331. Kramer et al., supra note 329.

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id
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the Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA, and the ICS-CERT
within the Department of Homeland Security, with the cooperation of multiple
medical devices manufacturers, began to examine medical device
vulnerabilities.
The heightened focus bore fruit almost immediately with a
336
The researchers, Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle,
report by two researchers.
discovered a hard-coded password vulnerability affecting roughly 300 devices
from approximately 40 manufacturers.3 37 The affected devices included surgical
and anesthesia devices; ventilators; drug infusion pumps; external defibrillators;
patient monitors; and laboratory and analysis equipment.3 3 8 In 2014, ICS-CERT
investigated roughly 24 medical devices, including an infusion pump from
Hospira, Inc. and implantable cardiac devices from Medtronic, Inc. and St. Jude
Medical, Inc. (other device manufacturers were not identified.) 3 3 9 In the case of
the Hospira infusion pump, the vulnerability left the device open to a hack that
could remotely force multiple pumps to dose patients with lethal amounts of
drugs.340 A Hospira spokeswoman, Tareta Adams, said that the company was
working to address any cybersecurity risks, noting that "Hospira has
implemented software adjustments, distributed customer communications and
made a commitment to evaluate other changes going forward, while ensuring we
are not adversely impacting the ability of our devices to meet hospital and
patient needs, and maintain compliance with FDA product requirements."34 1
The FDA continued giving heightened scrutiny to the area of cybersecurity
342
and implanted medical devices in 2014.
In August 2014, the FDA entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Health Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, Inc. (NH-ISAC), a non-profit health sector-led
organization that provides member entities with information about cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and helps coordinate cybersecurity incident response.3 4 3 The goal
of this partnership, according to the FDA is to:
*
foster stakeholder collaborations and communications;
* create awareness about the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework;

335. NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER, INTERNET
ACCESSIBLE CONTROL SYSTEMS AT RISK, ICS-CERT MONITOR, 3 (Jan.-Apr. 2014),

cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERTMonitor

https://ics-

Jan-April2014.pdf

336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Finkle, supranote 1.

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Memorandum of
UnderstandingBetween the National Health Information Sharing & Analysis Center, Inc. (NHISAC) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
FDA.Gov, (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/Memoranda
ofUnderstandingMOUs/OtherMOUs/ucm412565.htm.

343. Id-
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encourage healthcare and public health stakeholders to develop
strategies to assess and mitigate cybersecurity weaknesses; and
* build a foundation of trust within the healthcare sector that
encourages the timely sharing of cybersecurity vulnerabilities that
could jeopardize patient care. 344
And in October 2014, the FDA held an open workshop that brought together
a wide range of medical device manufacturers, trade organizations, and other
healthcare players to identify challenges and barriers to promoting medical
device cybersecurity, as well as to help participants develop standards and tools
for building a comprehensive cybersecurity program. 45 Also in October 2014,
the FDA issued a final [G]uidance for "the Content of Premarket Submissions
for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices."

3 46

This guidance

contained recommendations for medical device manufacturers on cybersecurity
management and information to include in a pre-market submission, including
such documentation as the following:
* a specific list of all cybersecurity risks that were considered in the
device's design;
* a specific list of and justification for all cybersecurity controls
established for the device;
* a summary describing the plan for providing validated software
updates and patches as needed throughout the lifecycle of the device
to assure its safety and effectiveness;
* a summary describing controls in place to assure that the medical
device software will remain free of malware; and
* device instructions and specifications that relate to recommended
cybersecurity controls (such as use of a firewall or anti-virus
software).3 47
In July 2015, the FDA issued a public warning regarding the security risks
348
associated with the use of Hospira's Symbiq infusion pumps.
In it, the agency
"strongly encouraged" hospitals and other healthcare facilities to cease operating
the infusion system (a computerized pump used to continuously deliver general

344. Id.
-

345. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Public Workshop
Collaborative Approachesfor Medical Device and Healthcare Cybersecurity, FDA.Gov (Oct. 21-

24, 2014),
79.htm.

http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm4129

346. U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, CONTENT OF PREMARKET

SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES, FDA.Gov

(Oct. 2,
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedoc
uments/ucm356190.pdf.
347. Id. at 6.
348. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Symbiq Infusion System by

Hospira: FDA Safety Communication-Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, FDA.Gov (Jul. 31, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/SafetyAlertsforHumanMedicalProducts/u
cm456832.htm.
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infusion therapy).3 49 The problem was that the pump, which communicated with
a hospital information system, could be remotely accessed through that network
by an unauthorized user, who could then tamper with dosages and cause serious
harm or even death to patients.350 This vulnerability was confirmed by Hospira
itself, although the FDA stressed that it was unaware of any actual unauthorized
access of the infusion pump in a healthcare setting, or of any patient injuries or
deaths.15'
However, the FDA as part of this warning did urge healthcare
organizations to follow its cybersecurity best practices, including taking steps to
limit device access to trusted users only; protect individual components of a
given device from exploitation; update appropriate anti-virus software and
firewalls; monitor activity for unauthorized use; and provide methods for data
retention and recovery after an incident in which security has been
compromised.3 52
This July 2015 action is significant because it marked the first time that the
FDA actually advised healthcare facilities to stop using a product due to a
cybersecurity threat. 53 Given the increased awareness of cyber threats involving
medical devices, as well as the FDA's more alert posture on this subject in the
last couple of years, it will likely not be the last. Indeed, the FDA started off the
New Year in 2016 by issuing (in draft form, for comment purposes only at this
stage) a new draft Guidance addressing post-market management of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.3 5 4 In this latest missive, the FDA acknowledged
the "growing concern" of cybersecurity threats to medical devices, and it noted
that while it was important for manufacturers to incorporate controls during a
device's design phase, it is "essential that manufacturers also consider
improvements during maintenance of devices, as the evolving nature of cyber
355
threats means risks may arise throughout a device's entire lifecycle."
The draft Guidance goes on to encourage device manufacturers to
collaborate with other stakeholders to share cybersecurity information, monitor
sources of cybersecurity information to identify and detect new risks and
vulnerabilities, and to adopt a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and

349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Cybersecurity for Medical
Devices and Hospital Networks: FDA Safety Communication, FDA.Gov (June 13, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm356423.htm.
353. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Citing Hacking Risk, FDA Says Hospira Pump Shouldn't Be
Used, GAZETTE, (Jul. 31, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://gazette.com/citing-hacking-risk-fda-says-hospirapump-shouldnt-be-used/article/feed/257499?customclick-rss.
354. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Postmarket Management of

Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, Draft Guidancefor Industry and Food and DrugAdministration
Staff
FDA.Gov
(Jan.
22,
2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM482022.pdf.
355. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA Outlines Cybersecurity

Recommendations for Medical Device Manufacturers, FDA.Gov (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.
fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm481968.htm.
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practice.3 5 6 It also takes the carrot rather than the stick approach, indicating that
under certain conditions where a vulnerability is quickly addressed and that
measure effectively reduces risk of harm to patients, the FDA will not enforce
urgent reporting requirements.35
This is contingent on certain conditions being
met, including no serious adverse events or deaths associated with the
vulnerability; manufacturer notification to users and changes implemented
within 30 days; and the manufacturer must be a member of an Information
Sharing Analysis Organization (ISAO), and report the vulnerability and how it
was assessed and remediated to the ISAO.
This draft Guidance, while still just in the "circulated for comments" stage,
represents the evolution in the FDA's regulatory stance regarding cybersecurity
risks and IMDs. It reflects the more collaborative, proactive approach that the
FDA has adopted and that it is encouraging medical device manufacturers to
adopt as well in order to best protect patient safety.

VII. CONCLUSION
Implanted medical devices, and indeed the entire adoption and integration of
wired and wireless networked medical devices, have provided incalculable
health benefits for millions of patients.3 5 9 However, the increasing number,
functionality, connectivity, and remote communications capabilities translate to
360
heightened security vulnerabilities.
A new security paradigm that both
welcomes technological innovation while assuring the well-being of millions of
IMD recipients will require a more concerted effort from all relevant
stakeholders-from cybersecurity researchers and device manufacturers to
doctors, patient advocacy groups, legislators, and regulatory authorities.
What can a device manufacturer do? The first step is examining its current
products and analyzing the risks raised. Only after such an analysis can a
company have the knowledge it needs to work with computer engineering and
cybersecurity specialists to develop targeted solutions. The next crucial step is
education. At every level, personnel must be trained in cybersecurity measures.
This includes general counsel, who must have a working knowledge not only of
cybersecurity protocols, but of relevant federal and state data security/data
privacy laws. Most importantly, the in-house counsel should have a data breach
action plan and response team prepared and standing by.
Another key factor for manufacturers, since they cannot hope to eliminate all
possible risks, is to regularly evaluate their insurance needs and coverages.
Many commercial general liability (CGL) policies do not cover cyberattacks, yet
even many so-called cyber liability policies may provide limited coverage for

356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Maisel & Kohno, supra note 54.

360. Id. at 1165-66.
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data breaches while excluding coverage for bodily injuries. 361 Manufacturers
should evaluate their existing coverages under existing "traditional" policies
such as directors and officers (D&O) and CGL policies, but they should also
carefully scrutinize available cyber liability coverage options.
Medical device manufacturers face a dizzying array of cybersecurity
concerns, regulatory scrutiny, and potential civil liability exposure in connection
with attacks on implantable medical devices, not to mention the damage that
could be done to a company's reputation as a result of an attack. Paying
attention to cybersecurity risks, educating personnel, and planning ahead for
insurance needs can help ensure that heart-pounding drama remains on the
television screen rather than in the boardroom or the courtroom.

361. See, e.g., Why Your General Liability Insurance Doesn't Cover Data Breaches,
INSUREON BLOG (Jan. 2, 2015 7:06 AM), http://www.insureon.com/blog/post/2015/01/02/whyyour-general-liability-insurance-doesnt-cover-data-breaches.aspx.
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